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Summary  8 
The central question in communication theory is whether communication is reliable, and if so, which 9 
mechanisms select for reliability. The primary approach in the past has been to attribute reliability to 10 
strategic costs associated with signalling as predicted by the handicap principle. Yet, reliability can 11 
arise through other mechanisms, such as signal verification; but the theoretical understanding of 12 
such mechanisms has received relatively little attention. Here, we model whether verification can 13 
lead to reliability in repeated interactions that typically characterise mutualisms. Specifically, we 14 
model whether fruit consumers that discriminate among poor and good quality fruits within a 15 
population can select for reliable fruit signals. In our model plants either signal or they do not; costs 16 
associated with signalling are fixed and independent of plant quality. We find parameter 17 
combinations where discriminating fruit consumers can select for signal reliability by abandoning 18 
unprofitable plants more quickly. This self-serving behaviour imposes costs upon plants as a by-19 
product, rendering it unprofitable for unrewarding plants to signal. Thus, strategic costs to signalling 20 
are not a prerequisite for reliable communication. We expect verification to more generally explain 21 
signal reliability in repeated consumer-resource interactions that typify mutualisms but also in 22 
antagonistic interactions such as mimicry and aposematism. 23 
Keywords: handicap principle, sanction, plant-animal communication, honest signalling, mimicry, 24 
aposematism 25 
26 
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 27 
Introduction  28 
The dominant issue in the study of animal communication in recent decades has been how (more or 29 
less) reliable communication can be maintained when signaller and perceiver differ in their selfish 30 
interests [1,2]. That is, the challenge is to explain how a correlation is maintained between variation 31 
in a signal and in an unobservable quantity that the perceiver is interested in, despite the potential 32 
for the signaller to gain by misinforming. The dominant theory used to explain honest 33 
communication in the face of conflicting interest between the signaller and perceiver has been the 34 
Handicap Principle [3,4]. This principle essentially assumes that there is a strategic cost to signalling 35 
over and above any costs associated with simply communicating efficiently, and this higher cost 36 
varies between signallers or brings varied benefits across signallers. Generally, this theory rests on 37 
the assumption that high-quality individuals are better able to bear the cost of a particular signal. 38 
This cost structure causes different types of signaller to invest differentially in signalling and thus 39 
allows the signal to be associated with information about the underlying variation among signallers. 40 
We refer to previous definitions of information as being a property of the perceiver and as being 41 
associated with a given sensory stimulation (see [5] for more details). In an important recent work, 42 
Számadó [6] argued that in fact the key to understanding signal reliability is that cheating will 43 
prosper unless it is more costly than reliability, and the signalling cost structure required by the 44 
Handicap Principle is only one way to achieve this situation; indeed Számadó lists ten different 45 
alternative mechanisms. However, here we suggest that the ability of the perceiver to verify the 46 
accuracy of the signal after it has responded to the signal is another, likely-widespread, but relatively 47 
neglected mechanism (but see [7]) that might be important in explaining some cases of reliable 48 
communication.  49 
The likely reason that signal verification has been largely overlooked is that (for reasons of 50 
mathematical tractability rather than biological realism) the theory of animal communication rests 51 
4 
 
almost exclusively on situations where individuals interact with each other only once, or 52 
(equivalently) that individuals encounter each other randomly and hold no memory of previous 53 
interactions [1,2]. In such cases, there is no benefit to the perceiver verifying that the signal was 54 
reliable or not, since it cannot act on this information. This is realistic for some situations, such as 55 
mate choice by females in species where individuals reproduce only once in their lifetime. However, 56 
in some species individuals do have the chance to evaluate to consequences of acting on a signal and 57 
modify their subsequent behaviour accordingly. Consider a long-lived avian species where females 58 
often keep the same sexual partner for several breading seasons. She may initially select males on 59 
the basis of some signal (e.g. song structure or plumage coloration) that is expected to correlate well 60 
ǁith the ŵale’s aďilitǇ to pƌoǀide food foƌ ĐhiĐks. After having selected a particular male to breed 61 
ǁith iŶ heƌ fiƌst seasoŶ, she is aďle to ŵoŶitoƌ the ŵale’s ĐhiĐk pƌoǀisioŶiŶg. That is, haǀiŶg iŶitiallǇ 62 
acted on the signal in mate choice, she is subsequently able to verify the reliability of that 63 
individual’s sigŶal. “he ĐaŶ theŶ aĐt on the information gained through signal verification, tending to 64 
stay with an honest signaller for the next breeding attempt or select a new male otherwise.  65 
Verification can play an important role in many other communication systems, particularly in 66 
mutualisms that typically involve repeated consumer-resource interactions where a consumer is 67 
likely to evaluate the quality of the resource [8]. A good example is plant-animal communication. 68 
Consider a pollinating insect that will often visit a number of flowers from the same plant in quick 69 
succession, but is more likely to leave the plant and travel a considerable distance before visiting the 70 
next flower if it encounters rewardless flowers [9]. Likewise, experiments have shown that 71 
hawkmoths reduce their effort invested in exploring a flower if this is relatively unrewarding 72 
compared to other flowers of the same species [10]. This behaviour can be characterised as self-73 
serving behaviour based on the verification of signalling and is expected to contribute to limiting 74 
cheating in plant-animal communication. As yet, a formal model to evaluate this conjecture is 75 
missing. 76 
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In seed dispersal mutualisms, consumers such as birds will often consume a number of fruits during 77 
a visit to a single plant, but can be sensitive to small variation in the nutritional contents of fruit [11]. 78 
Such fruit consumers are likely to leave a plant more quickly (consuming fewer fruits from it, and so 79 
potentially being less useful to the plant as a seed disperser) if the nutritional results from the first 80 
fruits it samples do not match its expectation from the signals (e.g. fruit coloration and odour) that 81 
first attracted it to the plant. We will focus on this last situation, and explore whether the ability to 82 
verify the signal (by evaluating the contents of consumed fruit) and act accordingly (abandoning 83 
plants that provide lower-value fruits after consuming fewer fruits) can drive reliable signalling. We 84 
consider a very simple system, since our aim is to evaluate the plausibility of this mechanism in 85 
general terms, rather than model any one particular system.  86 
The model  87 
We assume that there are N fruiting plants in a population, of which a fraction G are good quality 88 
and a fraction P (= 1-G) are poor quality; and there are n frugivorous birds, assuming that N and n 89 
are large. The type of a given plant (good or poor) is exogenously determined, and not a matter of 90 
active choice or strategy by the plant. A plaŶt’s stƌategǇ is either to signal or not (denoted by the 91 
subscripts S or N); a ďiƌd’s stƌategǇ is ǁhetheƌ to ďe ƌespoŶsiǀe to the sigŶal oƌ Ŷot. “peĐifiĐallǇ VS is 92 
the probability that a detected signalling plant is then visited by the bird. Since we assume that the 93 
seed disperser cannot evaluate the quality of the fruits prior to visiting the plant, it seems rational 94 
for VS to be either 0 or 1. The probability of visiting a detected non-signalling plant is VN, and similarly 95 
this is assumed to be either 0 or 1. It is not logical for a plant to invest some resources into a signal 96 
that reduces its attractiveness to birds; hence we can assume that birds are not less likely to respond 97 
to a signalling plant than to a non-signalling plant (VS ш VN), since such a situation would be 98 
evolutionarily unstable. Similarly, it seems illogical for the birds to ignore all plants, and thus VS > 0, 99 
so that we assume that VS = 1 and thus consider only two rational bird strategies: visit all plants (VS = 100 
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VN = 1) or visit only signallers (Vs = 1, VN = 0). We Đall the seĐoŶd stƌategǇ ͞ƌespoŶdeƌ͟, siŶĐe it is 101 
sigŶal seŶsitiǀe, ǀeƌsus the otheƌ ͞ŶoŶ-ƌespoŶdeƌ͟ stƌategǇ of ǀisitiŶg all plaŶts eŶĐouŶteƌed. 102 
We assume that birds that ignore the signal and visit any detected plant (non-responding birds) visit 103 
plants at a rate k. Notice that this value is the same no matter the signalling strategy of plants, so the 104 
signal does not make plants more easily found by birds. That is, signalling plants do not receive an 105 
additional benefit in being more conspicuous at a distance than non-signallers. This assumption was 106 
adopted for simplicity and to isolate the informational consequences of signalling from any other 107 
benefits. Essentially we assume that appearance and volatile emissions of the non-signalling plants 108 
may be selected to enhance their conspicuousness to frugivores, but that they have not been 109 
selected to communicate information about plant quality; if there is additional selection pressure on 110 
these traits to link them to plant quality then this change does not impact on conspicuousness. This 111 
assumption simplifies our model, but our qualitative results are not contingent on this assumption. If 112 
a bird visits only signalling plants then it visits plants at a rate k(s), where s ч (sͿ ч 1 aŶd s is the 113 
fraction of plants (of either quality) that signal. This captures the idea that responding only to 114 
signalling plants will increase the amount of time that must be invested to find each suitable plant (a 115 
cost of choosiness). However, this discount factor need not simply be s, since not all the ďiƌd’s time 116 
will be spent searching; some of the time will be spent in visiting a plant. Thus, for example, if the 117 
overall density of flowers is high, the cost of responding only to signallers is reduced and  takes a 118 
higher value.   119 
For convenience we define the parameter  by nk/N. This represents the rate at which each 120 
plant is visited in a population of non-responding birds. We also define r as the proportion of birds 121 
that are responsive to the signal. Then non-signalling plants get visited by birds at a rate (1-r), 122 
whereas signalling plants get visited at a rate (1-r+(r/s)).  123 
Signalling costs the plant a fixed cost C per unit time, which is independent of plant quality. 124 
Importantly, unlike the assumptions of the Handicap Principle, the cost of signalling is the same for 125 
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both plant types. There is a benefit to the plant in being visited by a bird, this benefit is considered 126 
to increase linearly with the number of berries consumed by the bird during its visit. We assume this 127 
number is independent of whether the plant signals or not, but is dependent on plant (and thus 128 
berry) quality. A bird visiting a good plant consumes NG berries, a bird visiting a poor quality plant 129 
consumes NP berries; with NP < NG. The total benefit that the bird gains from visiting a good plant 130 
(RG) is higher than the benefit from visiting a poor plant (RP); because more berries are consumed 131 
and these berries are of higher quality. We emphasize our assumption that the behaviour of the bird 132 
after reaching the plant is unaffected by whether its arrival at that particular plant was influenced by 133 
signalling or not.  134 
The payoffs 135 
Based on the assumptions above, we can define payoffs for plants as a function of quality and 136 
strategy, and for birds as a function of strategy. We define the payoff to a good-quality plant that 137 
signals, EGS, as  138 
. 139 
Similarly, the payoff for a poor-quality plant that signals is  140 
. 141 
For a good quality plant that does not signal, the payoff becomes  142 
; 143 
and for a poor quality non-signaller, 144 
. 145 
For a bird that ignores the signal the payoff is 146 
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. 147 
For birds that visit only signalling plants (i.e. that are responsive to signals), the payoff will depend 148 
on which plants are signalling. The particular expression can be constructed easily for any particular 149 
case. As an example, where good quality plants signal and poor quality plants do not, this payoff is 150 
simply 151 
. 152 
Identification of evolutionarily stable strategies 153 
Using the payoff structure defined above, we can find evolutionarily stable strategies where it pays 154 
no individual to deviate. We will consider only pure strategies (where plants of a given quality always 155 
or never signal, and birds always or never respond to signals), since there is not an obvious selecting 156 
force for intermediate (mixed) strategies. There are three types of individuals (good plants, poor 157 
plants & birds) each of which has two pure strategy options. This gives eight possible behavioural 158 
combinations across the ecosystem. However, of these eight possibilities some can quickly be 159 
discarded as evolutionarily unstable. Firstly, if birds do not respond to the signal, then no plant 160 
should invest in costly signals. Thus, if birds do not respond to the signal, the only stable option for 161 
plants is for both poor and good quality individuals not to signal. Thus we turn our attention to the 162 
situation where birds respond to the signal: thus r = 1, VS = 1 and VN = 0.  In this situation, there is 163 
considerable simplification of the payoffs to plants: 164 
, 165 
, 166 
. 167 
We need to consider four cases.  168 
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Case (i): Neither type of plant signals. In this case a bird that only visits signalling plants does poorly 169 
compared to one that visits all plants it discovers.  170 
. 171 
Thus, it is not stable to have no signalling plants but a signal-responsive bird.  172 
Case (ii): Poor plants signal; good plants do not. For all parameter values it is easy to show that  173 
, 174 
which means that if it is advantageous for poor plants to signal, then it will always also be 175 
advantageous for good plants to signal. Thus, there is no stable situation where only poor plants 176 
signal. This makes sense since the costs of signalling are the same for both plant types, but the 177 
benefits can never be less for the good plant type compared to the poor plants.  178 
Case (iii): Good plants signal and poor plants do not. For this to occur, we need the following 179 
conditions to hold for the plant strategies to be stable: 180 
.         (1) 181 
  182 
To make it profitable for the birds to respond to the signal, we require that 183 
.        (2) 184 
A necessary (but not sufficient) requirement for satisfying this condition is that that (G) > G, which 185 
we expect to be generally satisfied in any situation where a non-trivial amount of time is required to 186 
interact with any plant visited.  187 
Case (iv): In a situation where all plants are signalling (so that s=(s)=1), stability against either plant 188 
type switching to not signalling requires that NP > C, otherwise poor plants at least would switch. 189 
10 
 
When all plants signal, EBR = EBN, and so stability against a change of bird strategy is not immediately 190 
clear. However, such a situation is only potentially stable in our model because (for simplicity) we 191 
have assumed that there is no cost to the bird in recognising a signal. In reality, it is likely that when 192 
all flowers are signalling, birds that are unresponsive to the signal are likely to have higher fitness 193 
than those that must decide whether a fruit is signalling before deciding whether to land or not. This 194 
cost might be in investment in the cognitive processing associated with deciding whether a signal is 195 
present or not, or in occasionally making a mistake and rejecting a fruit because the signal was 196 
present but not properly detected. Thus, we would not expect to find the equilibrium where both 197 
plant types signal in the real world.  198 
In summary, the situation where no plant ever signals and birds are unresponsive to signals is always 199 
stable. However, another situation where poor plants do not signal and good plants do signal, with 200 
birds being responsive to the signal and only being interested in signalling (good quality) plants can 201 
also be stable, but only if the conditions described in (1) & (2) are met. Equation 1 suggests that the 202 
signalling equilibrium is stable only for a range of intermediate costs to signalling. If signalling costs 203 
are too low, then even poor-quality plants will benefit from signalling; if the costs are too high then 204 
even good quality plants do not benefit from signalling. The range of suitable cost values increases 205 
the ŵoƌe that good plaŶts ďeŶefit fƌoŵ a ďiƌd’s ǀisit ƌelatiǀe to the ďeŶefit of a ǀisit to a pooƌ plaŶt. 206 
Both the upper and lower boundaries for suitable costs increase with  (the rate at which birds visit 207 
plants in the absence of any signalling) and with (G): the modulation in rate of fruit visits that a bird 208 
experiences if it is responsive to the signal (which will increase as plants become abundant and/or 209 
conspicuous in the environment).  Both limits vary inversely with the fraction of good quality plants 210 
in the population. Equation (2) suggests that the signalling equilibrium will be more likely to be 211 
stable the more common good-quality plants are within the population. Satisfying this condition also 212 
places a lower limit on the ratio of the benefits to the bird of visiting a good quality plant relative to 213 
a poor quality one. The higher this ratio, the easier this condition will be to satisfy. It makes intuitive 214 
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sense that birds would benefit from attending to the signal when good plants are relatively valuable 215 
and are not too rare.   216 
Let us consider an illustrative example. If RG = 3 and RP = 1 and  217 
, 218 
then (from eqn. 2) we would only expect the signalling equilibrium to exist when G > 0.25. If we 219 
further assume that = 1, NP = 1, NG = 1.5  220 
then (1) simplifies to  221 
. 222 
Figure 1 shows the range of G and C values for which the signalling equilibrium exists in this 223 
example.  224 
Discussion 225 
In our simple model we have demonstrated that there are parameter value combinations where the 226 
ability of the perceiver to verify the reliability of a signal and act on it can allow for signal reliability 227 
(where only good quality plants signal in our model and birds bias their visits to signalling plants). 228 
Notice that such a bias is not a case of punishment of deceptive plants by birds. There is already an 229 
established theory on signal reliability driven by the risk of deception being discovered and punished 230 
(e.g. [7]). Punishment involves the perceiver realising that it has been deceived and paying the 231 
additional cost of punishment itself in order to inflict a cost on the signaller. In our case, crucially, 232 
although a bird leaves a poor quality plant earlier than it leaves a good quality plant, its decision to 233 
leave is unaffected by whether it decided to visit the plant on the basis of responding to a signal or 234 
not. Further, in doing this, the bird is not paying a cost in order to inflict a cost on the plant; rather 235 
the cost to the plant of earlier departure by the bird is driven entiƌelǇ ďǇ the ďiƌd’s self-interest and 236 
maximising its long-term reward rate. Our model thus assumes that birds sanction less-rewarding 237 
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partners by performing a self-serving behaviour that imposes costs on these partners as a by-238 
product (see [12] for discussion on punishment and sanctions). Sanctions in general, and our model 239 
in particular, give a biological interpretation to the concept of an optimization cost introduced by 240 
Számadó [6]  as a Đost ͞that is iŶdepeŶdeŶt of the sigŶalliŶg gaŵe aŶd that ƌesults from making a 241 
ďad deĐisioŶ iŶ the uŶdeƌlǇiŶg optiŵizatioŶ pƌoďleŵ.͟ Sanctions and optimization costs rely on 242 
signal verification, which is an important parameter in all repeated interactions between signaller 243 
and perceiver.  244 
The cost of cheating to a poor-quality plant that signals is that it does not get sufficient return from 245 
the birds it attracts to justify the cost invested in the signal. This is typical for mutualism with 246 
repeated interactions among the same partners. Note that the return obtained from seed dispersers 247 
in response to signalling are expected to depend on whether interactions are repeated or not. If 248 
plant species are primarily bird-dispersed and produce fruit during avian migration, as many 249 
temperate species do in late summer, it may pay even for poor-quality plants to signal and attract 250 
migrants even if these leave the plants after consuming only a few fruits. Unlike the repeated 251 
interactions modelled above, this would be an advertising strategy suited for one-shot interactions 252 
with many different consumers. This strategy is equivalent to a ͞tourist trap͟ ǁith ŵoƌe iŶǀestŵeŶt 253 
in attracting consumers rather than retaining a relationship with them after their first visit. 254 
The hawkmoth pollination study of [10] provides a clear empirical example of the general 255 
mechanism modelled in our paper. These authors exposed hawkmoth pollinators to either wild-type 256 
Petunia integrifolia or individuals genetically modified to reduce the volume of nectar offered by the 257 
flowers. The hawkmoths did not discriminate between the two types of plant in terms of 258 
preferentially visiting more rewarding individuals. However, hawkmoths spent less time probing 259 
genetically modified plants, and this led to reduced seed production in this type compared to the 260 
more rewarding wild type. Hand pollination experiments demonstrated that the GM plants actually 261 
had greater reproductive potential than the wild-type and their reduced seed set was thus caused by 262 
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the ďehaǀiouƌ of the haǁkŵoth polliŶatoƌs. The authoƌs ĐoŶĐlude that ͞a siŵple self-serving 263 
pollinator behaviour –the adjustment of probing time in response to nectar volume – may select 264 
against reducing nectar and protect plant-polliŶatoƌ ŵutualisŵs agaiŶst dƌift toǁaƌds paƌasitisŵ.͟ IŶ 265 
terms of the framework introduced in our paper, the floral displays remains a reliable signal of 266 
nectar reward because pollinating insects can verify the reliability of the signal and take action that 267 
harms the plant but benefits the pollinator by quitting unrewarding plants earlier. Given the 268 
simplicity of the model introduced here, we think there is reason to expect that many other natural 269 
examples of signal reliability maintained by signal verification await discovery.  270 
Readeƌs should ďe aǁaƌe that ďǇ ͞sigŶal ǀeƌtifiĐatioŶ͟ ǁe ŵeaŶ that a sigŶal perceiver is able to 271 
evaluate the consequences for it of reacting to a signal and modify its subsequent behaviour in the 272 
light of that information. In our model, the signal influences whether a bird visits a particular plant or 273 
not, but the factors influencing the decision to visit the plant (including the signal) do not influence 274 
the evaluation of the value of the plant or the response of the bird to that evaluation. Some authors 275 
might use a narrower definition of verification, where the signal has a greater influence: not just on 276 
the deĐisioŶ to ǀisit a plaŶt, ďut oŶ the ďiƌd’s ƌeaĐtioŶ to eǀaluatioŶ of plaŶt ƋualitǇ. Foƌ eǆaŵple, a 277 
ďiƌd’s ƌeaĐtioŶ to saŵpliŶg pooƌ ƋualitǇ fƌuit oŶ a plaŶt ŵight ďe iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ ǁhetheƌ theǇ ǁeƌe 278 
induced to visit the plant by apparent signalling of higher quality (i.e. by whether they had an 279 
eǆpeĐtatioŶ that this plaŶt ǁould offeƌ high ƋualitǇ fƌuitͿ. “uĐh ͞eǆpeĐtatioŶ effeĐts͟ aƌe ǀeƌǇ 280 
plausible and well documented in other contexts. However, our aim here was to explore whether 281 
reliable signalling could be maintained by even simpler behaviour by signal perceivers. The signalling 282 
discussed in this paper might also serve as an important stepping stone in the evolution of any more 283 
complex perceiver behaviours.     284 
 285 
There are parallels between our model of signalling, and an existing model of cleaner fish 286 
mutualisms [13]. In such interactions there is a temptation for the cleaner to cheat and try and eat 287 
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the flesh of the client fish as well as any parasites. However, their model predicted that this 288 
tendency for mutualism to slide into parasitism can be resisted providing the client has sufficient 289 
control over the duration of interactions, tending to terminate increasingly parasitic interactions 290 
increasingly quickly. This is very similar to our hypothetical model system where the reliability of 291 
signalling by plants is maintained by the tendency of the birds to quit plants that offer lower returns 292 
more quickly. Both their model and ours should have wide applicability. Reliability in the cleaner fish 293 
mutualism is further enforced by an audience effect, where cleaner fish are more cooperative in the 294 
presence of potential clients that witness their cleaner behaviour [14]. This additional mechanism 295 
that could enforce reliability is not expected to occur in plant-animal communication. However, if 296 
fruit consumers spend longer in more rewarding plants, this self-serving behaviour may alert other 297 
fruit consumers and attract them as a by-product to the food sources which are often (but not 298 
always) bonanza resources that are difficult to defend. This could be a mechanism through which 299 
rewarding plants obtain more dispersal services.  300 
Most models of the evolution of cooperation assume equality between partners in their ability to 301 
respond to the behaǀiouƌ of the otheƌ ;ofteŶ ďeiŶg ďased oŶ the Iteƌated PƌisoŶeƌ’s Dileŵma game; 302 
[15]), whereas many mutualisms (especially those between members of different species) involve 303 
strong asymmetry between partners in their scope for direct exploitation of the other like that 304 
considered by [13]. Similarly much signalling theory has been motivated by within-species 305 
communication in mate choice, social signalling and begging by offspring; but many between-species 306 
communication systems may offer the scope for the signal verification that is at the heart of our 307 
model. Clear examples are aposematism and mimicry. In aposematism would-be predators are 308 
educated to avoid potentially harmful prey. Studying signal design across populations varying in the 309 
relative abundance of models and Batesian mimics is likewise telling for understanding the factors 310 
influencing signal reliability [16].  311 
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The ďasiĐ stƌuĐtuƌe of ouƌ ŵodel has stƌoŶg siŵilaƌitǇ to a ͞diffeƌeŶtial ďeŶefits͟ ŵodel of ĐostlǇ 312 
signalling, such as that in the Sir Philip Sidney game. In our case, plants with good quality fruit 313 
receive a larger benefit (namely, more seeds dispersed) than do plants with poor quality fruit. As a 314 
result, these good quality plants are willing to pay more in the way of costs in order to reap their 315 
respective benefits. This is the core principle driving our model, just as it is the core principle driving 316 
the Sir Philip Sidney game. In this context, it is important to emphasize that the present analysis 317 
considers only pure strategies. It is possiďle that theƌe aƌe also ͞hǇďƌid eƋuiliďƌia͟ ǁheƌe high-quality 318 
individuals always signal while low-quality individuals have a mixed strategy of sometimes signalling 319 
and sometimes not signalling, and receivers always decline to act in the absence of a signal but 320 
sometimes act and sometimes decline in the presence of a signal [17,18]. Such equilibria exist for the 321 
Sir Philip Sidney game and may exist for the present game depending on the choice of parameters. 322 
Exploration of this would be valuable. 323 
We hope our work inspires others to explore the importance of signal verification to the 324 
maintenance of signal reliability in real systems, and to expand on the generality of the proof-of-325 
concept theory presented here. We believe that verification plays an important role in many 326 
communication systems given that signallers will naturally vary in quality owing to genetic and 327 
environmental conditions. Thus, our concept can be expanded to analyze core issues in signalling 328 
that still are controversial. First, what are the consequences of multivariate and continuous variation 329 
in signaller quality? Second, how does variation in the ability of perceivers to discriminate among 330 
different types of signals (or among signals that vary in their association to quality) influence the 331 
evolutionary stability of signal reliability? Answering both questions will provide a more 332 
encompassing functional understanding of the mechanisms promoting reliable communication in a 333 
range of communication systems.  334 
 335 
References  336 
16 
 
1. Maynard-Smith, J. & Harper, D. G. C. 2003 Animal Signals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 337 
2. Searcy W. A., Nowicki S. 2005 The evolution of animal communication. Princeton: Princeton 338 
University Press. 339 
3. Zahavi A. 1975 Mate selection: a selection for handicap. Journal of Theoretical Biology 53, 340 
205-214. 341 
4. Grafen, A. 1990 Biological signals as handicaps. Journal of Theoretical Biology 144, 246-517 342 
5. Ruxton G. D., Schaefer H. M. 2011 Resolving current disagreements and ambiguities in the 343 
terminology of animal communication. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 24, 2574-2585. 344 
6. Számadó S. 2011)The cost of honesty and the fallacy of the handicap principle. Animal 345 
Behaviour 81, 3-10. 346 
7. Lachmann, M., Számadó S. & Bergstrom, C. T. 2001 Cost and conflict in animal signals and 347 
human language . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 98, 13189-13194.  348 
8. Schwartz M.W., Hoeksema J.D. 1998 Specialization and resouce trade: biological markets as 349 
a model of mutualisms. Ecology 79, 1029-1038. 350 
9. Johnson S.D., Peter C.I., Agren J. 2004 The effects of nectar addition on pollen removal and 351 
geitonogamy in the non-rewarding orchid Anacamptis morio. Proceedings of the Royal 352 
Society of London B 271, 803-809. 353 
10. Brandenburg, A., Kuhlemeier, C. & Bshary, R. (2012) Hawkmoth pollinators decrease seed 354 
set of low nectar Petunia axillaris line through reduced probing time. Current Biology 22, 355 
1635-1639 356 
11. Schaefer H. M., Schmidt V., Bairlein F. 2003 Discrimination abilities for nutrients: which 357 
difference matters for choosy birds and why? Animal Behaviour 65, 531-541. 358 
12. Raihani N. J., Thornton A., Bshary R. 2012 Punishment and cooperation in nature. Trends in 359 
Ecology & Evolution 27, 288-295. 360 
13. Johnstone, R. A. & Bshary, R. 2002 From parasitism to mutualism: partner control in 361 
asymmetric interactions. Ecology Letters 5, 634-639. 362 
17 
 
14. Pinto A., Oates J., Grutter A., Bshary R. 2011 Cleaner wrasses Labriodes dimidiatus are more 363 
cooperative in the presence of an audience. Current Biology 21, 1140-1144. 364 
15. Alexrod, R.,Hamilton, W.D. 1981 On the evolution of cooperation. Science 211, 1390-1396. 365 
16. Harper G. R., Pfennig D. W. 2007 Mimicry on the edge: why do mimics vary in resemblance 366 
to their model in different parts of their geographical range? Proceedings of the Royal 367 
Society of London  B 274(1621), 1955-1961. 368 
17. Huttegger S.M., Zollman K.J.S. 2010 Dynamic Stability and Basins of Attraction in the Sir 369 
Philip Sidney game. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London  B 277, 1915-1922. 370 
18. Zollman K.J.S., Bergstrom, C.T., Huttegger, S.M. 2013. Between cheap and costly signals: the 371 
evolution of partially honest communication. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London  B 372 
280, 20121878.   373 
374 
18 
 
19.  375 
Figure 1: The range of G (fraction of plants in the population that are good quality) and C (the cost of 376 
signalling) values that allow a signalling equilibrium as well as the non-signalling equilibrium that is 377 
always stable. We assume that RG = 3,  RP = 1 and  , such that (from eqn. 2) the signalling 378 
equilibrium exists when G > 0.25, which is to the left of the vertical broken line. We further assume 379 
that = 1, NP = 1, and NG = 1.5, in which case eqn. (1) simplifies to  380 
, which gives the two solid lines in the figure. The Signalling equilibrium is stable only in 381 
the region bounded by the three lines; the non-signalling equilibrium is always stable. RG and RP are 382 
the benefits to the bird of visiting good and poor plants respectively; NG and NP are the benefits of a 383 
ďiƌd’s ǀisit to good aŶd pooƌ plaŶts ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ. The paƌaŵeteƌ  is the rate at which birds visit 384 
flowers in the absence of any signalling, and (G) is the modulating factor controlling how much a 385 
ďiƌd’s ƌate of ǀisitatioŶ is ƌeduĐed if it igŶoƌes ŶoŶ-signalling poor plants.  386 
